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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE RESTATEMENT AND TIEDE ARE CONSISTENT WITH 
MATHESON. AND UNDER ALL THREE, A BATTERY 
REQUIRES AN INTENT TO HARM IN ADDITION TO AN 
INTENT TO CAUSE A CONTACT. 
Regarding the elements of assault and battery, the Wagners and the State agree that 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 13 and 21 (1965) and Tiede v. State Department of 
Corrections. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996), are controlling. But contrary to what the State 
argues, the Restatement and Tiede require not just an intent to cause contact, but also an 
intent to cause harm. Both the Restatement and Tiede define assault and battery as acts 
intended "to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other." Restatement 
1 
(Second) of Torts, §§ 13 and 21; Tiede at 503 n.3. The State, when quoting that language, 
emphasizes the word "contact," ignoring the words "harmful or offensive" just before it. 
The Restatement and Tiede don't say "intending to cause contact," they say "intending to 
cause harmful contact." 
The Restatement and Tiede are consistent with, and reinforce, Matheson v. Pearson, 
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), in which the throwing of a tootsie pop at a person, which was a 
deliberate act intended to cause contact, was held not to be a battery because it was not 
intended to cause harm. That is the same thing required by the Restatement—not just an 
intent to cause a contact, but intent "to cause a harmful contact." The Restatement simply 
"restates" the common law, including Matheson and cases like it. Nothing in the 
Restatement invalidates Matheson. 
Tiede likewise is not invalidated by the Restatement. In Tiede, the issue was whether 
the State is immune from negligence actions for deaths, as opposed to nonfatal injuries, 
arising out of assault or battery. Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502. The Court, quoting the 
Restatement §§13 and 21 in a footnote, noted that the cause of the deaths in that case, a 
shooting, was assault and battery. IcL at 503 n. 3. But that was not in dispute. The plaintiffs 
did not allege that the shooting was anything other than an assault or battery. They did not 
allege that it was unintentional. The Court did not reach the issue of whether intent to cause 
a contact without intent to cause harm is enough to constitute an assault or battery, because 
it was never raised. Thus, Tiede did not adopt an intent-to-cause-contact-only standard as 
suggested by the State. On the contrary, in quoting the Restatement, which requires intent 
"to cause a harmful or offensive contact," Tiede confirms that assault and battery require 
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intent to harm in addition to intent to cause a contact. Rather than replacing Matheson. 
Tiede reinforces it. 
The requirement of intent to harm is neither outdated nor based on criminal law. The 
Colorado Supreme Court recently applied the rule in a civil case which involved a mentally 
disabled defendant. In White v. Muniz. 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000), an elderly woman who 
suffered from senile dementia struck her caregiver who then sued the elderly woman for 
assault and battery. The caregiver objected to a jury instruction given at trial which raised 
the issue of "whether an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor not only 
intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive 
to the other person." Id. at 816. 
Citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 8 (5th ed. 
1984) and Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 30 (2000), and quoting the Restatement, the 
Colorado Supreme Court first noted that "[s]tate courts and legal commentators generally 
agree that an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor intended harm or 
offense." 999 P.2d at 816. Ultimately the court held that "the law of Colorado requires the 
jury to conclude that the defendant both intended the contact and intended it to be harmful 
or offensive." IdL at 818. The court further explained that 
A jury can, of course, find a mentally deficient person 
liable for an intentional tort, but in order to do so, the jury must 
find that the actor intended offensive or harmful consequences. 
As a result, insanity is not a defense to an intentional tort 
according to the ordinary use of that term, but is a characteristic, 
like infancy, that may make it more difficult to prove the intent 
element of battery. Our decision today does not create a special 
rule for the elderly, but applies Colorado's intent requirement 
in the context of a woman suffering the effects of Alzheimer's. 
Id. 
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White proves that the Wagners' interpretation of Matheson, the Restatement, and 
Tiede is based on current, valid principles of civil law. It is important to note that the 
Wagners are not arguing for a bright line rule that mentally disabled persons are never 
capable of acting with intent, and therefore, their actions never constitute assault or battery. 
Rather, as the court said in White, it is an issue for the jury. "Juries may find it difficult to 
determine the mental state of an actor, but they may rely on circumstantial evidence [A] 
jury can examine the facts to conclude what another must have been thinking." Id, The 
Wagners have only alleged that the mentally disabled person in this case lacked the requisite 
intent, and on a motion to dismiss, that fact must be treated as though it were true. Whipple 
v. University of Utah. 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). To treat that fact as true, and still 
hold that his acts constituted assault or battery, would be creating a special rule that anytime 
a mentally disabled person's actions hurt another, it constitutes assault or battery, regardless 
of intent. 
II: THE DEFINITION OF BATTERY FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS THAT OF 
MATHESON. THE RESTATEMENT, AND TIEDE. 
REQUIRING INTENT TO HARM IN ADDITION TO INTENT 
TO CAUSE A CONTACT. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not define assault or battery for purposes 
of the act. Because the terms assault and battery are used, and they are legal terms, they 
must be given their legal meaning. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (2000) (requiring that 
terms in a statute, if they have a legal meaning, be given that meaning). They cannot be 
given a layperson's meaning, like "attack" or "grab." They must be given the definitions of 
civil assault and battery found in our case law. The definition of civil battery in Matheson. 
the Restatement, and Tiede requires both an intent to cause a contact and an intent to harm. 
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It is not an objective standard; it is not a question of whether it looks like a battery. It is a 
subjective standard; it is a question of what was intended. 
It is true that Utah courts have "consistently granted immunity to governmental 
entities for injuries that arise out of an assault or battery." Aple. Br. at 8. But that is a given. 
The issue here is whether injuries arise out of an assault or battery when, because of mental 
disability, the alleged assailant lacked the required intent. Utah courts have never addressed 
that issue. The cases cited by the State are distinguishable for that reason. 
The Utah Supreme Court did not reach that issue in Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 
P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), because the plaintiff did not raise it. The issue in Higgins was 
whether government immunity applies to injuries arising from assault and battery when the 
assailant is not a government employee. IcL at 240. Although the assailant was mentally ill, 
it was undisputed that her actions constituted assault or battery. The plaintiff did not allege 
that because of mental illness, the assailant was incapable of the required intent. On the 
contrary, the plaintiff claimed that the assailant had been "brooding and planning to hurt [the 
victim] for six months." Id. at 234. The Utah Supreme Court in Higgins did not rule 
expressly or otherwise that mental condition and intent are irrelevant to whether an injury 
arises out of an assault or battery. 
That issue was not before the Utah Court of Appeals in Wright v. University of Utah. 
876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), either. The plaintiff in Wright alleged that a 
government employee "assaulted and struck" her, and thereby admitted that her injuries 
arose from assault or battery. IcL at 381. Only later, in response to a motion to dismiss, did 
she claim that the assailant may have been mentally disabled and may not have formed the 
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required intent, but she never moved to amend her complaint. Id. at 384. The Court upheld 
the trial court's dismissal of the action for that reason alone. Id at 384-85. 
Although the Court discussed whether governmental immunity applies when the 
assailant was mentally disabled and did not form the required intent, its discussion was 
merely dicta as the issue was not before the court. The Court even stated, "We need not 
address this issue." Id. at 384. The State argues that the discussion was not dicta because 
the Court needed to address the issue of "whether the proposed amendment is "legally 
insufficient.'" Aple. Br. at 10. But there was no proposed amendment. The plaintiff never 
moved to amend her complaint. Therefore, the discussion of the issue in Wright is dicta and 
not controlling. 
Furthermore, the discussion should be disregarded because the reasoning behind it 
is no longer valid. In its discussion, the Court relied on federal cases interpreting the Federal 
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., since the FTCA and the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act have identical language applying immunity to actions "arising 
out of assault [or] battery," and therefore, it "may look to federal cases for guidance on 
interpreting that section." IdL at 386 n. 11. But the FTCA cases relied on by the Court are 
no longer a valid source for guidance. Although they have identical language, federal courts 
have interpreted the FTCA fundamentally differently than Utah courts have interpreted the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The FTCA cases relied on by the Court in Wright all 
involved an assault or battery by a government employee. Since those cases, the United 
States Supreme Court confirmed in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), that the 
FTCA only bars actions for injuries arising out of assault or battery by a government 
employee. 
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Federal courts can define assault and battery broadly, without defeating the purposes 
of the FTC A, because they apply the assault and battery basis for immunity narrowly, only 
to assault and battery by governmental employees. In contrast, Utah courts do not limit the 
assault and battery waiver of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to only assault and 
battery by government employees. See Higgins. 855 P.2d 231. If the Wagner's action were 
under the FTCA, there would be no immunity because Mr. Giese was not a government 
employee. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court in Sheridan reasoned that 
[i]f the Government has a duty to prevent a foreseeable 
dangerous individual from wandering about unattended, it 
would be odd to assume that Congress intended a breach of that 
duty to give rise to liability when the dangerous human 
instrument was merely negligent but not when he or she was 
malicious. In fact, the human characteristics of the dangerous 
instrument are also beside the point. For the theory of liability 
in this case is analogous to cases in which a person assumes 
control of a vicious animal, or perhaps an explosive device. 
Sheridan. 487 U.S. at 403. 
The point is, Utah courts should not adopt part of the federal courts' interpretation 
of the scope of immunity for assault and battery without adopting all of it. Since Utah courts 
have not followed FTCA cases in limiting immunity to when the assailant is a government 
employee, it should not follow FTCA cases regarding the intent required for assault and 
battery. 
If Utah courts do follow the FTCA cases at all, they should follow the FTCA cases 
on the issue that are more consistent with Utah's established case law. One such case is 
Moffitt v. United States. 430 F.Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In Moffitt, the plaintiff alleged 
that a mail carrier employed by the United States Postal Service "seized [her], threatened her 
with a deadly weapon and proceeded to sexually assault her and abuse her." Id at 37. The 
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plaintiff also alleged that the mail carrier was "in a state of mental derangement." Id at 38. 
In opposition to a motion to dismiss the plaintiff argued that there was a question of fact 
regarding whether the mail carrier had the ability "to have control of his mental processes 
necessary for the formation of the requisite mental element of intent required by definition 
before an assault (or battery) can arise." IdL The court agreed that "there cannot be an 
assault and battery . . . without a willful injury of the person upon whom the wrong is 
inflicted. The word 'willful' means nothing more than intentional." Id at 37-38. It also 
said, "It is obvious from the foregoing that this factual issue must be resolved by proof 
before the Court can make a determination." Id 38. This is consistent with Matheson. the 
Restatement, and Tiede. If Utah Courts follow any FTC A case, it should be Moffitt. 
Ill: UNDER EITHER STANDARD, THERE IS STILL A FACTUAL 
ISSUE THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED ON A MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even if only the intent to cause a contact is required, as the State claims, the Wagners 
have raised the issue of whether Mr. Giese intended anything at all. As explained before, 
intent, including the intent to cause a contact, is an inherently factual issue, to be decided by 
the jury. "Where intent is an essential element of a claim or defense, it is error to dismiss the 
claim as a matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6)." Richards Irrigation Company v. Karren.. 880 
P.2d 6, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The State claims the "trial court found the attack was a 
deliberate one." Aple Br. 6. On a motion to dismiss, however, the trial court cannot "find" 
anything. The court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and the reasonable 
inferences from those allegations. 
Wagners have alleged that Mr. Giese lacked the requisite intent. That includes both 
that he lacked the intent to cause a contact and that he lacked the intent to harm. On a 
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motion for summary judgment, that would raise a factual issue precluding summary 
judgment. On a motion to dismiss, that must be treated as though it were true. If it were true 
that Mr. Giese lacked the requisite intent, governmental immunity would not apply, and the 
case should not have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should follow the controlling Utah case law, and not create a special rule 
that anytime a mentally disabled person's actions hurt another, it constitutes battery, 
regardless of intent. The Governmental Immunity Act, when interpreted according to 
controlling Utah case law regarding the intent required for battery, does not bar the 
Wagners' action. The Wagners respectfully request that the decision of the trial court be 
reversed. 
DATED this ^ ^ a v of August, 2003. 
D. DAVID LAMBERT c 
LESLIE W.SLAUGH, and 
HELEN H. ANDERSON, for: 
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